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Many users today are struggling to manage an increasing 
number of passwords.  As a consequence, many 
organizations face an increasing demand on an expensive 
resource – the system administrators or help desks.  This 
paper suggests that re-considering the “3- strikes” policy 
commonly applied to password login systems would be an 
immediate way of reducing this demand.  We analyzed 10 
weeks worth of system logs from a sample of 386 users, 
whose login attempts were not restricted in the usual 
manner.  During that period, only 10% of login attempts 
failed.  We predict that requests for password reminders 
could be reduced by up to 44% by increasing the number of 
strikes from 3 to ten. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Many users are struggling to manage an increasing number 
of passwords [4] – the most commonly used authentication 
mechanism for computer security today.  A policy 
commonly applied to password mechanisms is the “three 
strikes” policy, meaning a user’s account is locked after 3 
failed login attempts.  Some organizations employ less 
drastic penalties - such as disabling logins to the account 
for a short period.  This penalty represents at best an 
annoyance for legitimate users prevented from logging in, 
and can at worst result in a significant disruption to their 
work.  After the account being suspended, users need to 
contact a system administrator or helpdesks to have their 
password reset-the user is given a new system password, 
and asked to substitute it with one of her own choice – but 
which conforms with a number of restrictions designed to 
ensure the password is secure.  Re-setting a password 
therefore consumes considerable user and company 
resources: time and effort not spent on production tasks, 
which may involve a customer waiting to be dealt with.  
Furthermore, it creates a high mental cost for the individual 
user, to select and then memorise the new password. For a 
certain amount of time after the re-set, this new password 
has to “compete” with the now defunct one in the users’ 
memory [4].  Furthermore, there is no perceived benefit for 
individual users in exchange for all the effort they have to 
expend.  In the longer term, such policies can foster 
negative perceptions of computer security, which 
predisposes users to subvert security mechanisms [1].   
Given the negative impact the policy has on users, and 
considering that it offers no additional protection against 
cracking (which most organizations perceive to be the 
biggest threat to password security), we feel it is time to 
question the validity of the policy. The security community 
cannot provide a rationale as to why 3 failed attempts is the 
right cut-off point.  The few discussions of the policy that 
can be found [e.g. 5] are not based on empirical evidence. 
This paper introduces a methodology that can be used to 
inform such discussions, and presents the first results of its 
application. 
METHODOLOGY 
The participants in the study were 386 undergraduate 
students enrolled on Computer Science courses at UCL.   
We examined system logs of their accounts on a Web-
based coursework system [described in 2] over the duration 
of an academic term (10 weeks).   
Participants logged to practice coursework questions and 
submit their answers to web-based multiple-choice 
assignments they had to complete for course credit.  The 
participants were allowed to practice coursework questions 
as often as they desired, but were allowed to submit each 
coursework exam only once. System logs recorded every 
successful and unsuccessful login attempt, as well as use of 
the password reminder facility.  The reminder facility e-
mails users their passwords on request – a practice which 
harbors significant security risks, and is thus not viable in 
many organizational contexts.  In most organizations, 
accounts are locked after failed attempts, and system 
administrators or system helpdesk have to re-store accounts 
for users. In many organizations, the cost of running these 
 
LEAVE BLANK THE LAST 2.5 cm (1”) OF THE LEFT 
COLUMN ON THE FIRST PAGE FOR THE 
COPYRIGHT NOTICE. 
 helpdesks has rocketed with the proliferation of systems 
requiring password authentication [4]. 
RESULTS 
Out of 386 participants, 34 (9%) required a reminder of 
their password over the 10-week period.  Table 1 shows 
that the average failure rate for passwords was one login 
failing per 10 attempts (10%). Approximately 7% of these 
failed logins led to password reminder requests.  This 
means that in organization where passwords are re-set 
through helpdesks, approximately 0.7% of login attempts 
can be expected to result in a helpdesk call. 
Table 1–Login success and failure 




































































  Login 
failure 
rate 
Total 13305  12044 1261  87  N/a 
Average 34.5  31  3.3  0.23  0.10 
Min.  1 0 0 0 0 
Max. 348 339  71  9  1 
St.dev. 35.5  32  7.6  0.87  0.16 
N. of 
people  386 386 386 386 386 
 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of login failures: the light 
bars represent the login failures of participants who used 
the password reminder facility, and the dark bars represent 
the login failures of participants who did not need 
reminders.  Figure 1 shows that participants who required 
password reminders suffered proportionately greater 
numbers of failed login attempts-for example 5% of this 





















No. of failed logins 
 
Figure 1-Distribution of numbers of login failures, for 
users who did/did not require password reminders. 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics about the relative 
numbers of failed login attempts for the two groups.   
N=236 because the other 150 participants did not have any 
login failures, and so could not be included in the table. 
Participants in the table who used password reminders 
experienced on average three times as many failed login 
attempts as participants who did not.  This difference is 
highly significant (F1,234=28.7, p<.001, eta squared = .109 , 
power = 1). 
Participants who required password reminders experienced 
an average of 6.9 failed login attempts per reminder, with a 
standard deviation of 7.5, and an average number of 2 calls 
to the helpdesk. 
Table 2 Failed login attempts, for participants who 




























4.1 2  1 57  6.5  202 
Reminders 
group  12.7 6  1 71  16.3  34 
Total 5.4  3  1  71  9.1  236 
 
To perform our analysis, we have assumed that the users in  
gave up in trying to login after having all their failed login 
attempts in one session.  This assumption has certain 
consequences that will be discussed in a later section: 
problems and risks and for the methodology.   
DISCUSSION 
Why not allow users 10 attempts? 
There are 3 immediate benefits from increasing the number 
of attempts users are allowed. 
1.  It reduces the demand on an expensive resource - 
system administrators or help desks. 
2.  Not having to change a password reduces the 
mental load on users, and 
3. reduces the time taken away from, and 
interference caused with, users’ production tasks. 
We suggest that 2. and 3. lead to a fourth benefit: 
4.  prevents an erosion of the respect with which 
users hold security, and improve compliance with 
important security roles.  
Organizations need to weigh these benefits against the 
increased  vulnerability to internal attackers trying to guess 
another users’ password. Benefits 2. & 3. only apply to the group of users that 
recovered from login failure, since the other group was 
doomed to forget their password anyway.  However, the 
fourth benefit applies to both groups, who may perceive 
that they've been unnecessarily forced to change their 
password by three strikes will.  We will deal with these 
separately below. 
User costs 
For this issue we must look at the distribution of failed 
logins among people who did not later require helpdesk 
support (Figure 1).  The existing norm of three strikes is 
predicted to work for 107 of the 202 users in the group 
who recovered and succeeded to login (53% of this group, 
or 28% of all participants).  Though 107 would be passed, 
the remaining 95 users in this group (47% of this group, or 
25% of all users) would be penalised by a three strikes rule 
because they took more than three attempts to successfully 
login.  The proposed norm of ten strikes would be enough 
to accommodate the vast majority of users who recovered 
from login failure (187 users, 93% of this group, 48% of all 
participants), penalizing the remaining 15 people in the 
group.   
Assuming that these figures are correct, what would be the 
impact on helpdesk use?  With no restrictions (equivalent 
to an unlimited strikes policy) we observed a baseline of 
87 helpdesk requests-which were due to the group who 
could not recover from their failed logins.  If we moved to 
a ten strikes policy we would expect a further 15 helpdesk 
requests (see previous paragraph), making a total of 102 
requests.  However, if we moved to a three strikes policy 
we would expect to see 95 requests above the baseline (see 
previous paragraph), leading to a total of 182 requests.  
Thus, moving from 3 to ten strikes could slash these 
predicted password-related helpdesk calls from 182 to 102 
- a 44% reduction. Given the cost involved in running 
helpdesks, this represents a significant saving. 
User perceptions 
To this issue, we must also look at the distribution of 
people who experienced login failures that did result in 
helpdesk requests (light bars in Figure 1).  11 people out of 
34 in this group would have survived a three strikes policy, 
leaving 23 people struck out.  Extending the number of 
strikes to ten would double the number of people 
accommodated to 23, leaving only a third of this group (11 
people) prematurely forced to call a helpdesk.   
The figures are much more dramatic when we add in the 
users from the previous section who would have been all 
right if given enough chances, and so who had a valid 
complaint.  With three strikes the number being unfairly 
curtailed is 118 (23+95) out of 386 (31%).  With ten strikes 
it is only 26 (11+15) (7%). 
The risks of 10 attempts 
By increasing the number of strikes, you increase the 
chance that an internal adversary may successfully guess 
the password and gain access to another users’ account.   
Moving from three strikes to ten approximately triples this 
risk.  However, if an organization promotes strong 
password content policies – which are needed to counteract 
the external threat of password cracking - then the actual 
risk will still be very small.  Moreover, Viega and McGraw 
[4] suggest that there be another strike counter operating in 
conjunction with the first, recording the total number of 
strikes rather than the number of strikes in a session.  After 
a suitably small total number of strikes is reached, such as 
200, then additional security procedures are started.  This 
would help to reduce any negative impact of moving from 
three strikes to ten. 
Limitations of the study 
In this study, we have equated the number of password 
reminders with login problems that require helpdesk 
support.  This in effect overestimates the number of login 
failures experienced before requiring helpdesk support, and 
the number of attempts users have to be allowed to reduce 
helpdesk load is probably lower than 10. 
We also have to consider that participants in this 
experiment had no password restrictions or policies placed 
upon them.  Users facing a set of policies governing their 
passwords may behave differently.  For example, users 
under a three strikes policy who need to contact a help desk 
are likely to use password prompts or caches (passwords 
kept in their diary, PDA, post-it notes, etc.) to avoid calling 
the help desk  – especially since some organizations, in the 
face of rising help desk cost, have taken to reprimanding 
users who draw on the resource too often.  These behaviors 
circumvent other common security policies, creating 
significant security risks [1].  
Even though we did not require them to do so, participants 
in this study tended to choose cryptographically strong 
passwords, which are difficult to remember [5].  Many 
organizations enforce cryptographically strong passwords, 
so the rate of failure should be comparable. 
Strengths of the research methodology 
Another argument of this paper is that we need more data 
on performance of security mechanims in everyday use in 
order to make good design decisions.  System logs – such 
as the ones used in this study – are a valuable tool to 
determine performance. Data collection is relatively simple.  
Specialized apparatus need not be necessary, but the 
authentication mechanism needs to be configured to record 
every authentication event.  Analysis is relatively simple as 
well.  Data preparation consists of counting the number of 
events of each type for each user.  Event types are quickly, 
accurately and reliably distinguishable, as they are logged 
with different labels.  Data analysis can be achieved using 
ubiquitous tools such as spreadsheets that offer pivot 
tables.  This approach is therefore simple, applicable in 
many real world contexts, and with few resources, and can 
even be conducted by non-usability experts - such as 
system administrators - who have easy access to the data. FURTHER WORK 
We believe that the following work will provide valuable 
knowledge for improving password mechanisms: 
Studying the effect of security policies-the present approach 
relies upon participants whose password use is not 
restricted by security policies.  We identified a potential 
risk to the validity of our results that participants might 
behave differently if they were subject to common security 
policies, including three strikes.  This study should be 
repeated to see the effects of these policies, including: 
requirement for strong password content, password expiry, 
multiple passwords, combinations of the above, and 
combinations of the above with unsynchronized password 
expiry.  As the design of the study becomes more complex, 
we can become much more confident that it reflects the 
situation of real users. 
Studying the effect of corporate populations-this is useful 
in two different ways: it enables us to make better 
predictions from student populations, and it can remove the 
necessity of complicated experimental design to achieve 
the results asked for in the previous recommendation for 
further work 
Creating and disseminating do-it-yourself research tools - 
it should be possible to create research tools that 
dramatically reduce the workload for systems 
administrators who want to do this work themselves.  The 
tools would be constructed for popular computing 
platforms including instructions on the configuration 
changes necessary to collect the data, and analysis 
templates into which systems administrators can drop the 
raw data, and have much of the analysis work done for 
them.   
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